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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
We study  behavior  in  repeated  interactions  when  agents  have  no information  about the
structure  of the  underlying  game  and  they  cannot  observe  other  agents’  actions  or payoffs.
Theory  shows  that  even  when  players  have  no  such  information,  there  are  simple  payoff-
based  learning  rules  that lead  to  Nash  equilibrium  in  many  types  of games.  A key  feature  of
these rules  is  that  subjects  search  differently  depending  on  whether  their  payoffs  increase,
stay constant  or  decrease.  This  paper  analyzes  learning  behavior  in  a laboratory  setting  and
ﬁnds strong  conﬁrmation  for  these  asymmetric  search  behaviors  in the  context  of  voluntary
contribution  games.  By  varying  the amount  of  information  we  show  that  these  behaviors
are  also  present  even  when  subjects  have  full information  about  the  game.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
. Introduction
Mainstream research in experimental game theory has focused primarily on situations where the structure of the game
s known and the actions of other players are observable. In practice, however, many strategic environments are so large
nd complex that individuals are mostly in the dark about others’ actions and how they affect their own  payoffs. How do
layers learn in such situations?
To address this question, we conducted a series of experiments in which subjects played a voluntary contribution game,
ut they had no information about the nature of the game, and they could not observe the actions or payoffs of the other
layers.1 In effect, subjects were inside a ‘black box’ and the only data available to them were the payoffs they received from
aking different actions. We  tested the key features of learning models that have recently been proposed for such settings,
nd compared subjects’ behaviors in the black box environment with other treatments where players were given increasing
 Nax’s research was  supported by the Ofﬁce of Naval Research Grant N00014-09-1-0751 and by the European Commission through the European
esearch Council Advanced Investigator Grant ‘Momentum’ 324247. Burton-Chellew’s research was supported by the European Research Council. West’s
esearch was  supported by the European Research Council. Young’s research was supported by the Ofﬁce of Naval Research Grant N00014-09-1-0751 and
he  Air Force Ofﬁce of Scientiﬁc Research Grant FA9550-09-1-053.
∗ Corresponding author at: ETH Zürich, Clausiusstrasse 37-C3, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland.
E-mail address: hnax@ethz.ch (H.H. Nax).
1 There is a related literature on low-information gambling tasks (Nevo and Erev, 2012; Erev and Haruvy, 2013; Ben Zion et al., 2010). Prior low-
nformation experiments in games provide subjects with some information allowing communication (Colman et al., 2010), or regarding the structure of
he  game (Rapoport et al., 2002; Weber, 2003) or other players’ actions (Friedman et al., 2015).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.04.006
167-2681/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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amounts of information about the nature of the game and about the actions and/or payoffs of the other players. Although
this information permitted more complex adaptive responses, we found that the key features of black-box learning models
are still present even when subjects have full information.
There is a growing body of theoretical work that shows how equilibrium (or near-equilibrium) play can evolve from
simple, adaptive rules that require no information about what other players are doing or ex ante knowledge of the game.
Such rules are said to be payoff-based or completely uncoupled,  because they depend solely on the pattern of an individual’s
received payoffs, and not on the behaviors or payoffs of anyone else.2 Classical reinforcement models form one class of
examples,3 but in recent years many other payoff-based rules have been identiﬁed that differ from classical reinforcement
in certain key respects. These rules go under a variety of names including ‘win-stay-lose-shift’ (Robbins, 1952; Nowak et al.,
1993), ‘near-far search’ (Thuijsman et al., 1995; Motro and Shmida, 1995), ‘exploration-exploitation’ (Eiben and Schippers,
1998; Bowling and Veloso, 2002), ‘trial-and-error’ (Young, 2009; Marden et al., 2009), and ‘probe-and-adjust’ (Skyrms, 2010).
Although these rules are broadly similar to reinforcement learning models, they differ by positing important asymmetries
in the way that subjects respond to different patterns of experienced payoffs. These rules are also quite different from belief-
based learning models, which typically assume that subjects know the structure of the game and can observe other players’
actions.
An essential feature of these rules is that the pattern of received payoffs triggers different modes of search: “experimen-
tation” (present when payoffs are steady or increasing), “exploration” (triggered when payoffs decline) and “inertia” (staying
with one’s previous choice).4 In this paper, we  formalize and test ﬁve speciﬁc behaviors that have been suggested in the
literature on payoff-based learning:
(i) Asymmetric inertia. Inertia is greater when payoffs are steady or increasing than when they are decreasing.5
ii) Asymmetric volatility. Adjustments have higher variance under exploration (when payoffs decline) than under experi-
mentation (when payoffs are steady or increasing).
iii) Asymmetric breadth. Adjustments are broader under exploration than under experimentation.6
iv) Reversion. Under both experimentation and exploration, reversion to one’s previous strategy is more likely when payoffs
decrease than when they are steady or increasing.
(v) Directional bias. When the strategy space can be linearly ordered, the direction of change tends to be reinforced: a
direction that leads to higher payoffs tends to be followed by a further change in the same direction next period; a
direction that leads to lower payoffs tends to be followed by a change of direction next period.
Various forms of directional bias have been discussed in the experimental literature; see among others Selten and Stoecker
(1986), Selten (1998), Harstad and Selten (2013), Bayer et al. (2013), Burton-Chellew et al. (28), and Nax and Perc (2015).
The other four features have been proposed in the following models, some of which are theoretical and some empirical.
1 Near-far search (Thuijsman et al., 1995; Motro and Shmida, 1995). This is an empirical model of bee foraging behaviour.
Bees search for nectar close to their current location (within a given patch of ﬂowers) as long as their payoffs are steady
or increasing. Once a drop in the nectar stream occurs they ﬂy far away to a new randomly chosen patch. Thus negative
payoffs trigger wide-area search, whereas steady or positive payoffs lead to local search (asymmetric breadth, asymmetric
volatility).
2 Win-stay-lose-shift (Robbins, 1952; Nowak et al., 1993). Subjects keep their current strategy if it has steady or increasing
payoffs; otherwise they choose a new strategy at random (asymmetric inertia).
3 Probe-and-adjust (Skyrms, 2010; Huttegger and Skyrms, 2012; Huttegger et al., 2014). Subjects occasionally experiment
with different strategies, which they retain if the resulting payoff is higher; otherwise they revert to their previous strategy
(reversion).
4 Trial-and-error (Young, 2009). Subjects retain their current strategy with high probability if payoffs are steady or increasing.
Occasionally they may  try a different strategy which is retained if the resulting payoff is higher; otherwise they revert to
the previous strategy. When subjects experience a decrease in payoff from their current strategy, they choose a new one
at random (asymmetric inertia, reversion).
2 For details about uncoupled and completely uncoupled learning rules respectively, see Hart and Mas-Colell (2003), Hart and Mas-Colell (2006), Foster
and  Young (2006), and Young (2009).
3 Classical reinforcement models include Thorndike (1898), Bush and Mosteller (1953), Suppes and Atkinson (1959), Herrnstein (1970), Harley (1981),
Cross (1983), Roth and Erev (1995), Erev and Rapoport (1998), Nevo and Erev (2012), and Erev and Haruvy (2013).
4 These asymmetries are crucial for their convergence properties (Foster and Young, 2006; Germano and Lugosi, 2007; Young, 2009; Marden et al., 2009,
2014;  Pradelski and Young, 2012; Skyrms, 2012; Huttegger and Skyrms, 2012; Huttegger et al., 2014).
5 A separate question is whether inertia is affected by the size as well as the direction of recent payoff changes (‘surprise triggers change’) as proposed
by  Nevo and Erev (2012). We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 3.
6 Note that adjustments can be broad (i.e. far from one’s current strategy) even though the variance of these adjustments is small; thus (ii) and (iii) are
distinct.
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We  shall show that all ﬁve features mentioned earlier are conﬁrmed at high levels of statistical signiﬁcance in the black
ox treatment. Moreover, even in the treatments where more information is available, none of the hypotheses can be
ejected. We  do not claim that these are the only relevant features of payoff-based learning, nor do we attempt to ﬁt a
arametric model to the data, as is common in much of the experimental games literature. Rather, our aim is to identify a
et of qualitative search behaviors that can be examined in many other settings.
The rest of this paper contains details of the experimental set-up, the description of the learning model, and the summary
f methods and results. An appendix containing experimental instructions, regression tables and ﬁgures follows the main
ext.
. The experimental set-up
.1. Data
A total of 236 subjects, in 16 separate sessions involving 12 or 16 subjects making 80 decisions each, participated in our
xperiments, yielding a total of 18,880 observations. In this section, we  shall describe the structure of each repeated game
xperiment, and the different information treatments. The data underlying this study were ﬁrst reported in Burton-Chellew
nd West (2013), which showed that fundamentally different information settings may  lead to very similar patterns of play
t the aggregate level. The purpose of the present paper is to identify speciﬁc adjustment patterns at the individual level
hat drive the macro-dynamics.
.2. Voluntary contribution game
The voluntary contribution game is the standard game in experimental economics to study the provision of public goods
Isaac et al., 1985; Isaac and Walker, 1988; Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011). It proceeds as follows. Each player i in population
 = {1, . . .,  n} makes a nonnegative, real-numbered contribution, ci, from a ﬁnite budget B > 0 (here B = 40). The vector of
ontributions is denoted by c = {c1, c2, . . .,  cn}. Given a rate of return,  e ≥ 1, the public good is provided in the amount
(c) = e
∑
i ∈ Nci and split equally amongst the players (if e < 1, R(c) would be a ‘public bad’). Write  for the payoff vector {1,
 . .,  n}. Given others’ contributions c−i, player i’s contribution ci results in the payoff
i =
e
n
∑
i ∈ N
ci + (B − ci).
.3. Nash equilibria
If the rate of return is low (e < n), an individual contribution of zero (‘free-riding’) is the strictly dominant strategy for
ll players. Similarly, if the rate of return is high (e > n), an individual contribution of B (‘fully contributing’) is the strictly
ominant strategy for all players. The respective Nash equilibria result in either nonprovision or full provision of the public
ood.
.4. Repeated game
In each experimental session, the same population S (with |S| = 12 or 16) plays four ‘phases’ where each phase is a twenty-
imes repeated voluntary contribution game. In each period t within a given phase, players in S are randomly matched (as
n Andreoni (1988)) in groups of four to play the voluntary contribution game. At the start of each period, each subject is
iven a new budget B = 40, of which he can invest any amount; however, subjects cannot invest money carried over from
revious periods. Other than that, subjects are free to invest any number of coins between 0 and 40 each periods.
The rate of return is either low (e = 1.6) or high (e = 6.4) throughout a given phase. Write Nt4 for any of the four-player
roups matched at time t. Note that, due to random group rematching, for every player i, the relevant group Nt4 (i.e. such
hat i ∈ Nt4 in period t) typically is a different one in each period t. Given others’ contributions ct−i for all t, each i receives a
otal of i =
∑
t=1,...,20
t
i
. The number i represents a monetary reward that is paid after the game.
.5. Information treatmentsEach experimental session (involving four phases) is divided into two  ‘stages’: phases one and two  of the session constitute
tage one, phases three and four constitute stage two. Each phase is a twenty-period voluntary contribution game with either
he low (e = 1.6) or the high (e = 6.4) rate of return, and in each stage both rates of return are played. The two  stages differ
ith respect to the information revealed in that treatment.
4 H.H. Nax et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 127 (2016) 1–15
Before the experiment begins, subjects are told that two separate experiments will be conducted, each stage consisting
of two games. At no point before, during, or in between the two  separate stages of the experiment are players allowed to
communicate. Depending on which treatment is played, the following information is revealed at the start of each stage.7
All treatments. During each phase, the same game is repeated for 20 periods. Each player receives 40 coins each period,
of which he can invest any amount. The amount not invested goes straight into his private account each period. After
investments are made, each player earns a nonnegative return from his investment each period which, at the end of the
experiment, he receives together with his uninvested money according to a known exchange rate into real money.
Black box. Subjects have no information about the structure of the game or about other players’ actions and payoffs. Subjects
play two voluntary contribution games (one with the high and one with the low rate of return). As play proceeds, subjects
only know their own contributions and realized payoffs.
Standard. The rules of the game are revealed, including production of the public good, high or low rate of return, and how
groups form each period. As the game proceeds, players receive a summary of the relevant contributions in their group at
the end of each period.
Enhanced. In addition to the information available in the standard treatment, the payoffs of the other group members are
explicitly calculated, and players receive a summary of their own and other players’ payoffs in their group at the end of
each period.
In each experimental session, every player plays two  black box games (one with the high and one with the low rate of return),
and either two standard or two enhanced information games (again one high and one low). Either the black box treatment
occurs ﬁrst, or a non-black box treatment occurs. Of the total of 18,880 observations, 9440 are black box, 4640 are standard,
and 4800 are enhanced. The order, of high and low rates of return and of treatments, is different in each session. Sessions
lasted between ﬁfty and sixty minutes, and subjects earned between £6.20 and £15.50 (mean earnings were £12.40).
2.6. Black box details
Black box is our main treatment, and our main analysis is based on sessions when black box is played ﬁrst. Recall that we
require the recruiting system (ORSEE) to select only those who had not previously participated in public goods experiments.
Thus, when black box is played ﬁrst, subjects are not likely to have prior knowledge of the structure of the game.
We shall reserve the term ‘black box’ for the case when the ‘no information’ treatment is played ﬁrst. Sessions when it is
played after the standard or enhanced treatments will be called ‘grey box’.
In the ‘black box’ treatment, subjects were told that the black box would convert their input (in coins) to an output (in
coins) via a mathematical function with a random component. The instructions (see Appendix B) are silent on the question
of whether this function might depend on the actions of others. Subjects were not told that they would be engaged in a
game, but the instructions do not rule out this possibility either. The asymmetric search behaviors that we  are testing are a
component of learning rules that have been proposed for highly uncertain environments of this type.
In the ‘grey box’ treatment, subjects are told that a new and separate experiment will be conducted and that all information
except for their own payoffs will be withheld. Since play in these sessions was  preceded by two voluntary contribution games
where subjects received full information about the structure of the game, they might (or might not) think that the grey box
treatment has a similar structure. However, they will still be unable to infer others’ contributions and the underlying rates
of return from the information they receive. We  make this distinction between black box and grey box because our payoff-
based learning model applies most evidently in the (pure) black box environment where more sophisticated learning models
cannot apply due to the complete absence of information about the structure and about others’ actions. Nevertheless, we
shall ﬁnd that many of the same learning behaviors are present in both treatments.
3. The learning modelIn this section, we present and test our behavioral hypotheses based on the analysis of the pure black box data, that is,
those sessions when black box was played before the standard or enhanced treatments. There were eight such sessions and
4960 observations.
7 See Appendix B for instructions. Further details about the experimental instructions such as screenshots can be found in Burton-Chellew and West
(2013).
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.1. Five behavioral hypotheses
Formally, we say that there is “inertia” in period t, that is, between periods t and t − 1, if ct
i
= ct−1
i
. Regarding non-inertial
djustments in period t, we distinguish between “experimentation”, present after previous payoff patterns were steady or
ncreasing (t−1
i
≥ t−2
i
), and “exploration”, which is triggered by payoff decreases (t−1
i
< t−2
i
).8
Consider the following example to illustrate our ﬁve learning hypotheses. Suppose that over three successive periods,
 − 2, t − 1 and t, an agent contributes ct−2
i
= 10, ct−1
i
= 10 and ct
i
= x with realized payoffs t−2
i
, t−1
i
and t
i
respectively.
(i) Asymmetric inertia. x = 10 is less likely if t−1
i
< t−2
i
than if t−1
i
≥ t−2
i
.
ii) Asymmetric volatility. The variance of x is higher if t−1
i
< t−2
i
than if t−1
i
≥ t−2
i
.
ii) Asymmetric breadth. The expected value of |x − 10|  is higher if t−1
i
< t−2
i
than if t−1
i
≥ t−2
i
.
iv) Reversion. Suppose that x /= 10 and that ct+1
i
= y is chosen in the next period (t + 1). In period t + 1, y = 10 is more likely
if t
i
< t−1
i
than if t
i
≥ t−1
i
.
v) Directional bias. Suppose that x /= 10 and that ct+1
i
= y is chosen in period t + 1. If x > 10, then, in expectation, y − x is larger
when t
i
≥ t−1
i
than when t
i
< t−1
i
. Similarly, if x < 10, then, in expectation, y − x is smaller when t
i
≥ t−1
i
than when
t
i
< t−1
i
. In other words, the direction of successful adjustments is reinforced.
e ﬁnd that all ﬁve features are conﬁrmed at a statistically signiﬁcant level (see Tables A1 and A2). The tests of signiﬁcance
ere conducted as follows. To test the hypothesis of asymmetric inertia, we  used an ordered probit regression of the inertia
ate controlling for session, phase, group, period and individual ﬁxed effects with individual-level clustering. Payoff decreases
urn out to have a signiﬁcant effect on the inertia rate: on average it reduces inertia (i.e. increases search probability) by 12%
± 2%): see Table A3.9 There is signiﬁcantly less inertia in the ﬁrst phase than in the second phase, and period ﬁxed effects
re negative until period six, suggesting that inertia tends to increase over time. Importantly, asymmetric inertia is already
resent in the ‘early’ periods (before period 10) of the experiment, as well as in the ‘later’ periods (after period 10).
We also examine the situation in which a subject keeps the same action for two periods in a row and in the second period
xperiences a payoff shock due to a change of strategy by someone else (whom he knows nothing about due to the black
ox environment). Again, we ﬁnd an asymmetric effect on search behavior in the next (third) period: on average a negative
ayoff shock increases the subsequent probability of search by 13% (± 4%) relative to a positive payoff shock. The baseline
nertia rate in this setting however is roughly 50% higher (± 3%) than when a subject did not keep the same action for the
wo prior periods.
These ﬁndings are broadly consistent with Nevo and Erev (2012)’s ‘surprise triggers change’ hypothesis when payoff
hocks are negative, but they are inconclusive when payoff shocks are positive. In the Nevo and Erev (2012) experiment,
ubjects either get very low payoffs (0, or −1) or very high payoffs (10 or −10), whereas in our setting, subjects experience a
hole range of payoffs and there is no clear demarcation between ‘ordinary’ and ‘surprise’ payoffs. It is conceivable that if a
ubject happens to experience a series of small payoffs and then suddenly gets a very large increase, inertia might go down
ut our dataset does not contain the necessary number of cases to be able to test this possibility.
For asymmetric volatility, we apply Levene’s test, a nonparametric test for the equality of variances in different samples.
he null hypothesis of equal variances following steady/increasing payoffs versus decreasing payoffs, which would imply
o asymmetric volatility, is rejected with 99% conﬁdence. The same is true for early and late periods of the game. This holds
or both high and low rates of return and for different orders of the games (see Table A4).
We test asymmetric breadth by regressing the absolute values of the non-inertial adjustments conditional on
teady/increasing payoffs versus payoff declines, controlling for session, phase, group, period and individual ﬁxed effects
ith individual-level clustering. The average adjustment following steady/increasing payoffs is smaller than after payoff
eclines (99% conﬁdence; see Table A5). The same is true for early and late periods. Moreover, breadth is signiﬁcantly larger
n the ﬁrst phase than in the second. Other ﬁxed effects are not signiﬁcant.
We test for reversion much as we did for asymmetric inertia. Payoff decreases turn out to have signiﬁcantly positive
ffects on the reversion rate (see Table A6). Again, the same is true for early and late periods, but the effect is smaller in the
rst phase than in the second phase, i.e. reversion increases over time. Other ﬁxed effects are not signiﬁcant.
Finally, we analyze the directional patterns of adjustments. Our hypothesis of directional bias states that (i) if an increase
eads to steady/increasing payoffs, the player’s next-period contribution will tend to be higher than if it leads to payoff
eclines; (ii) if a decrease leads to steady/increasing payoffs, the player’s contribution next period will tend to be lower than
f it leads to payoff declines. To test this hypothesis, we  regress the difference between adjustments after steady/increasing
ayoffs and adjustments after payoff declines, controlling for the direction of the previous adjustment as well as for session,
hase, group, period and individual ﬁxed effects with individual-level clustering. The directional bias is conﬁrmed, for both
rior contribution increases and prior contributions decreases, at high levels of signiﬁcance (p < 0.01). The details are given
n Table A7.
8 The inclusion of stable payoffs in “experimentation” (i.e. not in “exploration”) is a key characteristic of trial-and-error learning (Young, 2009).
9 The range corresponds to the 95% conﬁdence interval.
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after increase after decreaseFig. 1. All treatments, both rates of return. The bar charts summarize the ﬁve learning model components in all treatments for both rates of return separately.
For  (ii), (iv) and (v), the y-axes are units of contributions; for (i) and (iii), the y-axes are probabilities. We denote the cases of steady or increasing payoffs
by  ‘success’, and decreasing payoffs by ‘failure’.
3.2. Non-black box learning
In this section, we assess our black box ﬁndings in light of the data from grey box and from the other two treatments,
standard and enhanced. In particular, we investigate whether our learning model describes only black box behavior or
whether its components also persist in the other settings, that is, where players gain experience and/or have explicit
information about the structure of the game and others’ actions (and payoffs).
Fig. 2 illustrates play in the different treatments, averaged over individuals and sessions. Different information clearly
makes a difference in the level of contributions and/or convergence rates under the high rate of return (see also Burton-
Chellew and West, 2013). However, the basic features of our learning model persist in all sessions and treatments, as is
summarized in Fig. 1.
A noteworthy feature is that convergence to equilibrium is both more pronounced and more similar across treatments
when the rate of return is low (e = 1.6) than when it is high (e = 6.4). Furthermore, contributions in the low-rate-of-return
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ase are higher in the standard treatment than in the enhanced treatment. Under the high rate of return, contributions tend
o polarize over time: some subjects appear to learn the dominant strategy (full contribution) whereas others do not. This
ontrasts with the learning dynamics under the low rate of return, where contributions gradually shifted from near-random
ontributions in early period to low-or-zero contributions in the later period.10 Hence, providing more information can
ctually lead to decreasing play of the dominant strategy, which supports the hypothesis that our ﬁve behavioral features
till have bite with more information. In other words, some subjects continue to act as if they were inside a black box even
hough they are not. The slow-down of convergence in the high-rate-of-return case, especially under black box, could be
he result of the ‘payoff variability effect’ (Myers and Sadler, 1960; Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Erev and Barron, 2005;
rev and Haruvy, 2013), according to which increased payoff variability may  inhibit learning (see Appendix A, Fig. 4). In the
tandard and enhanced conditions, it could moreover be the case that subjects did not understand (fully) that they had a
ominant strategy, or that relative payoff concerns interfered with equilibrium play. We  leave further investigations of this
eature to future research.
.2.1. Black box versus grey box
Next, we shall investigate ‘grey box’ play. Recall that grey box means that black box is played after either enhanced or
tandard. Even though subjects are explicitly told that a separate experiment is started after the ﬁrst stage of the experiment,
layers may  or may  not make inferences about the game structure. We shall investigate the consequences of this effect in
omparison with (pure) black box behavior. Our analysis reveals that, although there are differences in average levels of
ontribution in the two cases (Fig. 2), all of the features of our learning model are robust for both rates of return (see also Fig. 1).
n particular, the differences in inertia rates conditional on steady-or-increasing payoff versus decreasing payoff are similarly
obust, however, the level of inertia in absolute terms is higher in grey box than in black box (Test 1, Table A8). The levels of
symmetric volatility and asymmetric breadth are not signiﬁcantly different in the two cases (Test 1, Tables A9 and A10). The
ifferences in reversion are robust, but higher in grey box than in black box (Test 1, Table A11). Directional bias is unchanged
n terms of size and signiﬁcance (Test 1, Table A12). We  conclude that grey box differs from black box with regard to the
bsolute levels of inertia and adjustment, but not qualitatively with respect to any of the ﬁve learning model components.
.2.2. Black box versus standard and enhanced
Finally, we consider whether the standard and enhanced treatments lead to different conclusions. The situation is sum-
arized in Fig. 1. Panel (i) in Fig. 1 illustrates that inertia rates decrease after payoff decreases in all treatments. This
teady-or-increasing payoffs versus decreasing payoffs differential in inertia rates is statistically signiﬁcant in all four treat-
ents, and there is higher absolute inertia in non-black box treatment data (see Test 2, Table A8). Asymmetric volatility,
hough smaller in absolute size in the standard treatment and even smaller in the enhanced treatment, is higher after
ayoff decreases than after steady or increasing payoffs in all treatments (see panel (ii) in Fig. 1). Moreover, this difference
s signiﬁcant at the 1% level (see Test 2, Table A9). Asymmetric breadth, too, exhibits an analogous differential as in black
ox (see panel (iii) in Fig. 1). It continues to be statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (see Test 2, Table A10). Panel (iv) in
ig. 1 illustrates that reversion rates increase after payoff decreases in all treatments except for under the standard treatment
10 See Appendix A, Fig. 3 for initial versus ﬁnal contributions in the different treatments.
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when e = 6.4, but signiﬁcant overall (see Test 2, Table A11). The difference is statistically signiﬁcant in all four treatments, and
there are higher absolute reversion rates in non-black box treatment data (see Test 2, Table A11). Finally, panel (v) in Fig. 1
illustrates the presence of directional biases across all four treatments. We qualitatively conﬁrm the directional bias from
the black box data when analyzing the non-black box data at levels that are statistically signiﬁcant (see Test 2, Table A12).
4. Conclusion
Much of the prior empirical work on learning in games has focussed on situations where players have a substantial amount
of information about the structure of the game and they can observe the behavior of others as the game proceeds. In this
paper, by contrast, we have examined situations in which players have no information about the strategic environment. This
takes us to the other end of the information spectrum. Players in such environments must feel their way toward equilibrium
based solely on the pattern of their own realized payoffs.
To highlight the potential differences between adaptive learning and best-reply dynamics, we  implemented a black box
environment in a voluntary contribution game and compared the resulting behavior to play under intermediate and rich
information treatments. We  identiﬁed ﬁve key features of the learning dynamics: asymmetric inertia, asymmetric volatility,
asymmetric breadth, reversion, and directional bias. Although these components have precursors in both psychology and
biology, they have not been given the precise formulation that we propose here. It turns out all ﬁve features are validated
at high levels of statistical signiﬁcance in the black box treatment. Moreover, they are present even when players gain more
experience and/or have more information about the game. Whether this remains true for other classes of games is an open
question for future research.
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Appendix A. Regression outputs
In the following, a single star indicates p < 0.05, double-stars indicate p < 0.01.
Table A1
Summary statistics for asymmetric inertia, asymmetric volatility, asymmetric breadth, and reversion (black box).
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Learning component Payoff decreases Steady/increasing payoffs Difference (c) − (d)
(i) asymmetric inertia
Probability of zero adjustments
Relative frequency 0.23 0.33 0.10**
# observations 520 722
(ii)  Asymmetric breadth
Absolute value of non-zero adjustments
Mean 11.4 9.2 2.2**
#  observations 1746 1476
(iii)  Asymmetric volatility
Standard deviation of adjustment
Standard deviation 15.6 13.6 2.0**
# observations 1746 1476
(iv)  Reversion
Probability of return after search
Relative frequency 0.21 0.08 0.13**
#  observations 160 57
Table A2
Summary statistics for (v) directional bias (black box).
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Mean non-zero adjustment Steady/increasing payoffs Payoff decreases Difference (b) − (c)
After increase −1.6 −6.5 4.9**
After decrease 2.5 5.5 −3.0**
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Table  A3
Asymmetric inertia (black box). We use black box data from phases 1 and 2. We perform an ordered probit
regression of absolute adjustments controlling for session, phase, group, period and individual ﬁxed effects
with individual-level clustering. The pseudo-R2 indicates the level of improvement over the intercept model
(not  interpretable as percentage of variance explained).
Coefﬁcient (test statistic)
1 if “payoff decreases” −0.52 (−10.39)**
1  if “period” < 10 0.22 (1.37)
1  if “phase” = 1 −1.21 (−50.38)**
Periods Not listed
Individual ﬁxed effects Not listed
Group ﬁxed effects Not listed
Session ﬁxed effects Not listed
Cut −0.05 (s.e. 0.13)
Observations 4464
Adjusted pseudo-R2 0.40
Table A4
Asymmetric volatility (black box). We  use black box data from phases 1 and 2. We perform Levene’s robust
variance test, W being the Levene’s test statistic.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Test  1: Asymmetric volatility Steady/increasing payoffs Payoff decreases Total
Null  rejected (W = 39.9, p < 0.01)
Standard deviation 13.6 15.6 14.8
Mean  +1.2 −1.5 −0.3
Frequency 1476 1746 3222
Table A5
Asymmetric breadth (black box). We  use black box data from phases 1 and 2. We perform an OLS regression of
absolute adjustments controlling for session, phase, group, period and individual ﬁxed effects with individual-
level  clustering.
Coefﬁcient (test statistic)
1 if “payoff decreases” 2.28 (6.89)**
1  if “period” < 10 1.28 (1.25)
1  if “phase” = 1 2.75 (2.40)*
Periods Not signiﬁcant
Individual ﬁxed effects Not listed
Group ﬁxed effects Not listed
Session ﬁxed effects Not listed
Constant 4.49 (3.07)**
Observations 3222
Adjusted R2 0.30
Table A6
Reversion (black box). We use black box data from phases 1 and 2. We perform an ordered probit regression
of  reversion rates controlling for session, phase, group, period and individual ﬁxed effects with individual-level
clustering. The pseudo-R2 indicates the level of improvement over the intercept model (not interpretable as
percentage of variance explained).
Coefﬁcient (test statistic)
1 if “payoff decreases” 0.72 (8.39)**
1  if “period” < 10 −0.42 (−1.73)*
1  if “phase” = 1 0.08 (1.37)
Periods Not signiﬁcant
Individual ﬁxed effects Not listed
Group ﬁxed effects Not listed
Session ﬁxed effects Not listed
Cut 1.29 (s.e. 0.19)
Observations 3252
Adjusted pseudo-R2 0.26
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Table A7
Directional bias (black box). We use black box data from phases 1 and 2. We perform OLS regressions (without
constant) to test for the directional bias of adjustments for each directional impulse controlling for phase, group,
period and individual ﬁxed effects with individual-level clustering.
Coefﬁcient (test statistic)
1 if “up” −3.48 (1.14)
1  if “up” and “steady or increasing payoff” 4.53 (5.35)**
1  if “down” 9.20 (2.83)**
1  if “down” and “steady or increasing payoff” −3.07 (3.70)**
1  if “period”<10 −0.25 (−0.19)
Periods Not signiﬁcant
Individual ﬁxed effects Not listed
Group ﬁxed effects Not listed
Phase ﬁxed effects Not listed
Session ﬁxed effects Not listed
Observations 3264
Adjusted R2 0.11
Table A8
Asymmetric inertia (non-black box). We  use non-black box data; phases 3 and 4 for grey box (Test 1), and
phases 1–4 for standard and enhanced (Test 2). We  perform an ordered probit regression of absolute adjust-
ments controlling for treatment effects as well as session, phase, group, period and individual ﬁxed effects with
individual-level clustering. The pseudo-R2 indicates the level of improvement over the intercept model (not
interpretable as percentage of variance explained).
Test 1: Grey box Test 2: Standard &enhanced
coefﬁcient (test statistic) coefﬁcient (test statistic)
1 if “payoff decreases” −0.45 (−9.14)** −0.34 (9.98)**
1  if “period”<10 −0.49 (−3.17)** −0.35 (3.15)**
1  if “enhanced” n/a 0.96 (44.85)**
Periods Not signiﬁcant Not signiﬁcant
Other ﬁxed effects Not listed Not listed
Cut  5.05 (s.e. 0.23) 0.52 (s.e. 0.09)
Observations 4032 8464
Adjusted pseudo-R2 0.39 0.44
Table A9
Asymmetric volatility (non-black box). We  use non-black box data; phases 3 and 4 for grey box, phases 1–4 for
standard and enhanced. We perform Levene’s robust variance tests for asymmetric volatility in grey box (Test
1),  and standard and enhanced (Test 2). Recall W is the Levene’s test statistic.
Steady/increasing payoffs Decreasing payoffs Total
Test 1: Grey box
Null rejected (W = 23.3, p < 0.01)
Standard deviation 14.6 17.3 16.2
Mean +2.0 −1.9 −0.1
Frequency 1053 1206 2259
Test  2: Standard and enhanced
Null rejected (W = 9.3, p < 0.01)
Standard deviation 14.4 15.8 15.5
Mean +2.8 −3.6 −0.6
Frequency 1707 1931 3638
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Table  A10
Asymmetric breadth (non-black box). We use non-black box data; phases 3 and 4 for grey box (Test 1), phases
1–4  for standard and enhanced (Test 2). We  perform OLS regressions of absolute adjustments controlling for
session, phase, group, period and individual ﬁxed effects with individual-level clustering.
Test 1: Grey box Test 2: Standard and enhanced
coefﬁcient (test statistic) coefﬁcient (test statistic)
1 if “payoff decreases” 2.09 (5.10)** 1.36 (4.93)**
1  if “period”<10 Not signiﬁcant Not signiﬁcant
Periods Not signiﬁcant Not signiﬁcant
Other ﬁxed effects Not listed Not listed
Constant 19.91 (16.71)** 18.85 (19.68)**
Observations 2259 3638
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.47
Table A11
Reversion (non-black box). We use non-black box data; phases 3 and 4 for grey box (Test 1), and phases 1–4 for
standard and enhanced (Test 2). We perform an ordered probit regression of absolute adjustments controlling
for treatment effects as well as session, phase, group, period and individual ﬁxed effects with individual-level
clustering. The pseudo-R2 indicates the level of improvement over the intercept model (not interpretable as
percentage of variance explained).
Test 1: Grey box Test 2: Standard &Enhanced
coefﬁcient (test statistic) coefﬁcient (test statistic)
1 if “payoff decreases” 0.82 (8.17)** 0.60 (8.70)**
1  if “enhanced” n/a −0.58 (−11.08)**
1 if “period”<10 −0.04 (0.15) 0.00 (−0.01)
Periods Not signiﬁcant Not signiﬁcant
Other ﬁxed effects Not listed not listed
Cut  2.19 (s.e. 0.24) 1.01 (s.e. 0.17)
Observations 2304 3725
Adjusted pseudo-R2 0.26 0.22
Table A12
Directional bias (non-black box). We use all the data. We perform OLS regressions (without constant) to test for
the  directional bias of adjustments for each directional impulse in grey box (Test 1) and standard and enhanced
(Test 2) controlling for session, phase, group, period and individual ﬁxed effects with individual-level clustering.
Test 1: Grey box Adjustment: coefﬁcient (test statistic)
1 if “up” −3.86 (−1.88)*
1  if “up” and “steady or increasing payoffs” 5.24 (5.58)**
1  if “down” 8.91 (4.50)**
1  if “down” and “steady or increasing payoffs” −2.41 (2.98)**
1  if “period”< 10 0.48 (0.31)
Period ﬁxed effects Not signiﬁcant
Group dummies Not signiﬁcant
Other ﬁxed effects Not listed
Observations 2381
Adjusted R2 0.18
Test 2: Standard and enhanced Adjustment: coefﬁcient (test statistic)
1 if “up” −3.04 (−1.84)*
1  if “up” and “steady or increasing payoffs” 3.98 (5.53)**
1  if “down” 8.16 (4.76)**
1  if “down” and “steady or increasing payoffs” −0.50 (−0.68)
1  if “enhanced” −1.30 (−0.88)
1  if “period”<10 0.32 (0.27)
Period ﬁxed effects Not signiﬁcant
Group dummies Not signiﬁcant
Other ﬁxed effects Not listed
Observations 3938
Adjusted R2 0.22
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Appendix B. Instructions of the lab experiment
Participants received the following on-screen instructions (in z-Tree) at the start of the game. The set of instructions
in standard and enhanced were the same, different instructions were given in black box. In black box, participants had to
click an on-screen button saying, “I conﬁrm I understand the instructions” before the game would begin. The same black
box instructions were used for both rates of return. The standard/enhanced instructions differ with respect to the relevant
numbers for the two rates of return, and the example is adequately modiﬁed.
B.1. Black box
The following instructions were used in black box.
Beginning of instruction.
Instructions
Welcome to the experiment. You have been given 40 virtual coins. Each ‘coin’ is worth real money. You are going to make
a decision regarding the investment of these ‘coins’. This decision may  increase or decrease the number of ‘coins’ you have.
The more ‘coins’ you have at the end of the experiment, the more money you will receive at the end.
During the experiment we shall not speak of £ Pounds or Pence but rather of “Coins”. During the experiment your entire
earnings will be calculated in Coins. At the end of the experiment the total amount of Coins you have earned will be converted
to Pence at the following rate: 100 Coins = 15 Pence. In total, each person today will be given 3200 coins (£4.80) with which
to make decisions over 2 economic experiments and their ﬁnal totals, which may  go up or down, will depend on these
decisions.
The Decision
You can choose to keep your coins (in which case they will be ‘banked’ into your private account, which you will receive
at the end of the experiment), or you can choose to put some or all of them into a ‘black box’.
This ‘black box’ performs a mathematical function that converts the number of coins inputted into a number of coins to
be outputted. The function contains a random component, so if two people were to put the same amount of coins into the
‘black box’, they would not necessarily get the same output. The number outputted may be more or less than the number
you put in, but it will never be a negative number, so the lowest outcome possible is to get 0 (zero) back. If you chose to
input 0 (zero) coins, you may  still get some back from the box.
Any coins outputted will also be ‘banked’ and go into your private account. So, your ﬁnal income will be the initial 40
coins, minus any you put into the ‘black box’, plus all the coins you get back from the ‘black box’.
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You will play this game 20 times. Each time you will be given a new set of 40 coins to use. Each game is separate but the
black box’ remains the same. This means you cannot play with money gained from previous turns, and the maximum you
an ever put into the ‘black box’ will be 40 coins. And you will never run out of money to play with as you get a new set of
oins for each go. The mathematical function will not change over time, so it is the same for all 20 turns. However as the
unction contains a random component, the output is not guaranteed to stay the same if you put the same amount in each
ime.
After you have ﬁnished your 20 turns, you will play one further series of 20 turns but with a new, and potentially different
black box’. The two boxes may  or may  not have the same mathematical function as each other, but the functions will always
ontain a random component, and the functions will always remain the same for the 20 turns. You will be told when the 20
urns are ﬁnished and it is time to play with a new black box.
If you are unsure of the rules please hold up your hand and a demonstrator will help you.
I conﬁrm I understand the instructions (click to conﬁrm)
End of instructions.
.2. Standard and enhanced
Here, we present the instructions for the rate of return e = 1.6. The same instructions apply to standard and enhanced
reatments. Equivalent instructions apply for the rate of return e = 6.4.
Beginning of instructions.
Instructions
Welcome! You are about to participate in an experimental study of human decision making. Thank you for your participa-
ion in our study. Please pay careful attention to the instructions on the following screens. If you wish to return to a previous
creen, press the left arrow key. You are now taking part in an economic experiment. If you read the following instructions
arefully, you can, depending on your decisions, earn a considerable amount of money. It is therefore very important that
ou read these instructions with care.
Everybody has received the same instructions. It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants during
he experiment. Should you have any questions please ask us by raising your hand. If you violate this rule, we  shall
ave to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.
During the experiment we shall not speak of £ Pounds or Pence but rather of “Credits”. During the experiment your
ntire earnings will be calculated in Credits. At the end of the experiment the total amount of Credits you have earned will
e converted to Pence at the following rate: 100 Credits = 15 Pence. In total, each person today will be given 3200 credits
£4.80) with which to make decisions over two economic experiments and their ﬁnal totals, which may go up or down, will
epend on these decisions.
We  are researching the decisions people make.
This part of the experiment is divided into separate rounds. In all, this part of the experiment consists of 20 repeated
ounds. In each round the participants are assembled into groups of four. You will therefore be in a group with 3 other
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participants. The composition of the groups will change at random after each round. In each round your group will therefore
probably consist of different participants.
In each round the experiment consists of two  stages. At the ﬁrst stage everyone has to individually decide how many
credits they would like to contribute to a group project. These decisions have consequences for people’s earnings. At the
second stage you are informed of the contributions of the three other group members to the project and how many credits you
have received from the group project. New groups are then randomly formed and the process repeats itself, with everyone
again deciding how many credits they would like to contribute. This process will repeat 20 times.
At the beginning of each round, each participant receives 40 credits. In the following we  call this your endowment. Your
task is to decide how to use your endowment. You have to decide how many of the 40 credits you want to contribute to a
group project and how many of them to keep for yourself. The consequences of your decision are explained in detail in the
following slides.
Please note:
• The set-up is anonymous. You will not know with whom you are interacting.
• You will interact with a random set of 3 players in each round.
• Your decisions, and your earnings will remain anonymous to other players, even after the session has ended.
We now provide an animated illustration of a hypothetical scenario to demonstrate how the experiment works. In the
following demonstration, we will use these green ‘disks’ to represent ‘credits’. 1 disk equals 1 credit.
Example
Remember! Credits = real money, and the more credits a player has at the end of the experiment, the more money that
player will receive.
There are 4 players in each group, For the sake of convenience, we  refer to these players as Player A, Player B, Player C,
and Player D.
These 4 players then each receive an endowment of 40 credits.
Each of the players can then choose to make a contribution to the group project. They can contribute anything from zero to
40 credits. Non contributed credits are kept in the player’s private account. They do this at the same time and anonymously.
Each player is then informed of the decisions of all their group members, although no one will know who the players are
and they will randomly change in each round.
After all 4 players have made their decision to contribute or not, and by how much, the resulting total of contributed
credits is automatically MULTIPLIED.
In your experiment, in every round, and in this example here, the total will be multiplied by 1.6. So for an imaginary total
of 10 credits, this would result in 16 credits.
This new total is then always shared out equally between all 4 players. So, after the multiplication occurs, each player
receives one quarter of the credits that are in the group project.
In this example, each player chooses to contribute 20 of their 40 credits. This means the group project has 80 credits;
20 + 20 + 20 + 20 = 80 credits. Which when multiplied by 1.6 results in 128 credits; 80 multiplied by 1.6 = 128 credits. These
128 credits are then shared out equally, giving 32 credits back to each player; 128 divided by 4 = 32 credits each. This gives
each of the players a new total. In this case, they all have a new total of 52 credits.
They all started with +40; Contributed −20; and all got +32 in return, giving them 52 in total.
That is the end of the demonstration.
Remember, this was just one of many possible scenarios. In the rounds you will now play, all players are free to choose
how much they wish to contribute to the pot.
End of instructions.
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